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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
IMPORT RELIEF - JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL DIS-
TRICT COURTS - SUFFICIENCY OF JURISDICTION TO
HEAR DISPUTES INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REGULATIONS IF DISPUTE NOT LIKELY TO
RIPEN SUFFICIENTLY FOR CUSTOMS COURT JURIS-
DICTION
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977).
Sneaker Circus, an importer of non-rubber footwear made in Taiwan
and Korea, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for Eastern New York
naming the President and various trade representatives as defendants.
The action was brought to invalidate two orderly marketing agreements
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limiting the quantity of footwear imported from the Republic of Korea
and the Republic of China.' The Plaintiff alleged that certain public
hearings required under the Trade Act of 1974 had not been held and
argued that the alleged omission was sufficient to invalidate both
agreements. Without ruling on the merits of either claim, the District
Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss on the ground that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action was vested exclusively
with the Customs Court.2
Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court.3 This
decision is important for two reasons: first, it clarifies and confirms an
extension of district court jurisdiction; and second, it guarantees access to
court for plaintiffs like Sneaker Circus which cannot invoke Customs
Court jurisdiction in disputes arising under customs law.
The jurisdiction of the Customs Court has been defined by statute4
and recognized in court decisions.5 Its authority is exclusive in disputes
arising under the Tariff Act of 1930 and its subsequent amendments.6 In
J.C. Penney Co. v. Treasury Department, the district court found a clear
Congressional intent to exclude customs cases from the district courts.
7
Moreover, the Court indicated that even if the dispute was not ripe for
Customs Court review, that did not mean that it was to be automatically
placed under district court jurisdiction.' While exclusive, Customs Court
jurisdiction is limited in that it may be invoked only by a plaintiffs
protest of a formal determination by a U.S. Customs Official. 9 This
requirement reflects the origin of the court as a forum for review of
Customs Service decisions. 10 It presents a problem, however, for a
1. The agreements and agreed minutes were published as notices in the
Federal Register. 42 Fed. Reg. 32440 (1977), and 42 Fed. Reg. 42268 (1977).
2. Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977).
3. Id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(a), states in part: "The Customs Court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions instituted by any person whose protest
pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has been denied, in whole or in
part, by the appropriate customs officer ......
5. See, J.C. Penney Co., Inc. v. United States Treasury Department, 319 F.
Supp. 1023 (1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971)
and Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938).
6. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1976), as amended, and the
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976).
7. 439 F.2d at 67.
8. Id. at 68.
9. 566 F.2d at 399.
10. For a brief discussion of the history of the U.S. Customs Court see, [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 3189.
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plaintiff who is prevented by circumstances from making the jurisdiction-
creating protest.
In the instant case, protest was impossible because of the enforcement
procedures established under the two orderly marketing agreements. The
provisions of these agreements provided that the governments of Taiwan
and Korea would control their exports to the United States by issuing a
limited number of export visas for non-rubber footwear. In both countries,
heavy penalties were established to punish exporters who failed to obtain
visas. The role of the U.S. Customs Service under the agreements is
merely to count the pairs of footwear which are imported, and certify the
validity of the foreign export visas. The plaintiff, Sneaker Circus, would
have been able to invoke Customs Court jurisdiction had the Customs
Service ever been forced to exclude a shipment of footwear for violating
the agreements. The enforcement arrangements in the exporting nations
were so strict, however, that it appeared as though the Customs Service
would never have to take such action. On appeal the government argued
that the Congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Customs
Court precluded review of customs law cases by any other court. The
appellate court rejected this contention, finding that the "Exclusive
jurisdiction" of the Customs Court does not extend to cases which cannot
be heard in that court. "The point is . . .that the case will never ripen
sufficiently to meet the statutory requirements for [Customs Court]
jurisdiction. When this situation occurs, jurisdiction over, a customs
matter which presumptively inheres in the Customs Court reverts to the
District Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337."11 This conslusion was
supported by specific precedents involving exceptional customs cases
which had been argued in district court.' 2 The court also relied upon
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner3 and subsequent cases which held that
executive actions are reviewable in the courts unless there is a clear intent
to the contrary expressed by Congress. No such intent was expressed
concerning disputes under the customs laws.14
The second issue addressed in the instant case was whether a dispute
concerning an orderly marketing agreement is justiciable. Executive
agreements with foreign governments generally are not subject to judicial
inquiry because they are deemed to involve "political questions." The
appellate court stated that a challenge to the "substance" of the orderly
11. 566 F.2d at 399-400.
12. See, Timken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976) and Consumers
Union v. Kissenger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1974). See
also 3 INT'L TRADE L. J. 149 (1977).
13. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
14. 566 F.2d at 401.
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marketing agreements would not be justiciable because of the political
question exception. However the court regarded the claim of Sneaker
Circus as a challenge to the "procedure" by which the agreements were
reached. The procedures in the instant case are mandated by statute,
consequently, judicial review was held to be appropriate. 5
Viewed in its entirety, this decision at first reflects a traditional
Anglo-Saxon reluctance to leave a plaintiff without a remedy. It also
shows a willingness on the part of the court to assert its power of review
in the area of international trade.
The appellate court's "activist" response comes at the end of a decade
which has seen tremendous U.S. concern over developing fair rules for
international trade.' 6 The increasing number and complexity of interna-
tional agreements may result in U.S. business enterprises resorting more
frequently to the District Courts for relief. The decision in the instant case
should provide some encouragement for domestic concerns which perceive
a need for judicial intervention in the future. 17
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15. Id. at 402.
16. Perhaps the greatest single example of this concern is the Tokyo Round of
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations which is currently being completed in Geneva,
Switzerland.
17. Questions concerning the exclusivity of Customs Court jurisdiction remain
uncertain despite this decision. In Consumers Union of the United States v.
Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir.
1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that
Customs Court jurisdiction was exclusive in a dispute involving essentially the
same issues as presented in the instant case. That court, however, did not reach
the additional issue presented in Sneaker Circus, which involves a plaintiffs right
to relief in instances of U.S.-sanctioned foreign import controls which preclude the
jurisdiction-creating exclusionary decision by an United States Customs Official.
For a discussion of Consumers Union, see 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 482 (1978).

